Does the State's project model KS2 make the giga projects both more expensive and worse?
There is enormous potential for reducing uncertainty and increasing precision in the implementation of public megaprojects.
By forcing the state's megaprojects through a project and management model that is not adapted to the complexity, size and nature of the projects, the state itself contributes to increasing the risk of cost overruns and reduced benefit for the users.
Despite the project model, things go wrong
The government's project model KS2 is a method for planning, implementing and managing projects in the public sector in Norway. The model emphasizes ensuring quality, transparency and learning in the project.
The requirements imply that the projects must undergo external quality assurance before the decision-making basis is presented to the government and the Storting. The aim is to avoid wrong investments and keep good control of costs and benefits through planning and implementation of the projects and in that way ensure the most efficient use of the community's resources. So far so good.
However, despite the project model, despite the fact that the projects are quality assured by experts unrelated to the project, things go wrong. And this particularly applies to megaprojects.
Why is it like that? Why do projects such as Follobanen, Campus Ås and large municipal projects such as New water supply in Oslo and Fornebubanen go so wrong?
Why are IT projects, which have a completely different character from building and construction projects, carried out according to the exact same project model?
What is the significance of the external quality assurance?
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